David R. Moore, Ph.D.

Assistant Professor of Finance, College of Business Administration

  • Los Angeles CA UNITED STATES
  • Finance and Computer Information Systems

Contact

Biography

You can contact David Moore at David.Moore@lmu.edu.

David Moore is an assistant professor of finance at Loyola Marymount University. He earned his B.S. in engineering management and MBA from the University of Tennessee at Chattanooga (UTC). He competed in track and field and cross-country while at UTC, earning Academic All-American honors in 2010. In 2018, he joined LMU after earning his Ph.D. in finance from the University of Kentucky. Professor Moore’s research is in corporate finance with a focus on payout policy. He studies the reasons why firms repurchase shares as well as the manner in which they buyback those shares. At LMU, David teaches “Introduction to Corporate Finance” at the undergraduate level. Outside of academics, David enjoys cycling, running, swimming, beach volleyball, and traveling to new places with his wife.

Education

University of Kentucky

PhD

Finance

2017

University of Tennessee at Chattanooga

MBA

2012

University of Tennessee at Chattanooga

BS

Engineering Management

2010

Social

Areas of Expertise

Corporate Finance
Payout Policy
Compensation

Accomplishments

Mullineaux Award

2017-06-16

Best Ph.D. student in the Gatton College

Schnatter Institute Fellowship

2016-06-17

Summer research grant

AFA Doctoral Student Travel Grant

2016-06-10

AFA Doctoral Student Travel Grant

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Affiliations

  • American Finance Association
  • Financial Management Association
  • MFA Finance
  • European Finance Association
  • Small Business Administration

Event Appearances

Program Committee, Session Chair, Discussant, Presenter

Eastern Finance Association  Philadelphia

2018-07-13

2017 American Finance Association; Financial Management Association

2017 American Finance Association; Financial Management Association  Chicago, IL

2017-01-09

Discussant, Session Chair

2016 American Finance Association; Financial Management Association  

2016-06-10

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Research Focus

Commitment versus Financial Flexibility in Payout Decisions: Evidence from 10b5-1 Preset Repurchase Plans

We are the first to document and study the use of Rule 10b5 1 preset repurchase plans. Though the Rule’s original intent was to clarify conditions for enforcing insider trading laws, generally thought to apply to individuals classified as firm insiders, we find strong use of the Rule at the firm level to repurchase company stock. We exploit this new and widespread form of payout to examine an issue at the core of payout decisions—the tradeoff between commitment and financial flexibility. Relative to open market repurchases, preset plans provide an expanded repurchase window and increased legal cover, albeit at the cost of reducing repurchase flexibility and the option to time repurchases. These costs and benefits are significantly associated with Rule 10b5-1 adoption: Firms with alternative sources of financial flexibility are more likely to pre-commit to a repurchase plan, as are firms with a history of poor repurchase timing and firms constrained by blackout windows. Consistent with preset plans signaling commitment, Rule 10b5-1 repurchase announcements are associated with greater and faster completion rates, with more positive market reactions, and with more dividend substitution than open market repurchases. Lastly, we find that preset repurchase plans represent a unique payout tool whose introduction encouraged a different set of firms to buy back stock and significantly altered the payout landscape.

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Managerial Self-Interest and Strategic Repurchases: Evidence from Equity Vesting Schedules

This paper studies the strategic use and timing of share repurchases by insiders for personal gain. Using grant level compensation data and a hand-collected sample of monthly repurchases, I find a positive relation between CEO equity sales and share repurchases. I identify the relation using the vesting schedule of equity grants as an instrument for equity sales. This behavior is stronger when the CEO is chairman of the board but otherwise is persistent across firm characteristics. However, these repurchases do not appear to destroy shareholder value. The results indicate managerial self-interest and CEO contracts motivate a subset of share repurchases.

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The Evolution of Employee Compensation, Dilution, and Payout Policy

We examine the relation between equity compensation and payout policy in light of the shift from options to restricted stock and the rise in performance-based compensation. Our results strongly support dilution as the primary channel through which compensation relates to payout policy; dividend protection no longer has first-order effects on payout. Analyses using a shock to compensation around mandatory option expensing and an instrumental variable approach suggest that the relation between dilution and payout is likely causal. Further, as the dilution channel predicts, equity compensation positively relates to repurchase frequency and thus repurchase timing.

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Courses

FNCE 3410

Fundamentals of Finance

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